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BLOCKAGE VALUATION IN FEDERAL TAX LAW 
By HARROP A. FREEMAN t and STEPHEN P. VINCIGUERRA :j: 
Rebecca died at the age of eighty-five. In life she conceived only 
four children. In death, she gave birth to many more problem chil-
dren. For, Rebecca was possessed of .s8,557 shares of Bridal Night-
gown Company common stock, and her flesh and blood progeny owned 
the other 4I,443 shares. 
To the Federal Tax Collector, problems of valuation were not 
new. In fact, his training antedated the stock market crash of I929, 
and from personal experience he recalled that sales of a few shares 
did not guarantee the sale of a large block of shares at the same price. 
He knew that value is an association of an item of property in terms 
of money and is a question of fact to be determined from all the cir-
cumstances, and that in order to have such value the stock must 
possess potential, easy and prompt realization. But, alas, he turned 
to his books, seeking a definition from whence to begin. 
GENERAL VALUATION 
There he found that the statutes, the tax regulations, and the 
courts assumed that the phrase "fair market value" possessed a mean-
ing. Yet apparently, attempts to define "value" had been in vain,-
or rather successful in establishing that value may mean one thing for 
one purpose, and quite a different thing for another. For value is a 
word of many meanings, 1 and if it· be taken from its environment, it 
becomes as a fish out of water-lifeless. Its connotation will differ 
according to the use, whether it be applied in bankruptcy, condemna-
tion, rate-fixing, accounting or taxation. 
"Valuation . . . means the procedure and technique of esti-
mating the value of specific property at a stated time and place." 2 
Here our environment is taxation, and for purposes of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the regulations have attempted to define, 3 albeit 
obtusely, what is meant by "fair market value." 
t Professor of Law and Secretary, the Cornell Law School. 
:j:LL.M., Cornell, I94S; member, New York Bar. 
I. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. P. S.C., 262 
u.s. 276, 310 (I923). 
2. I BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (Ist ed. I937) IO. 
3. Regulations 105, Relating to the Estate Tax, Section 8I.Io (I94I): 
Valuation of Property. 
(a) General-The value of every item of property includible in the gross 
estate is the fair market value thereof at the time of decedent's death; • • • The 
fair market value is the price at which the property would change hands between 
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:rhis the regulations do via the hypothetical willing-but-not-
obliged-to-buy-purchaser premise.4 We are further directed to seek 
the market price or the mean between the highest and the lowest 
quoted selling prices on the valuation date and to take into considera-
tion all relevant facts and elements of value. 
BLOCKAGE V ALUAT10N 
Rebecca died possessed of a block of over 58,ooo shares, nearly 
6o% of the. outstanding stock. May the size of the holdings be con-
sidered as a relevant fact or element of value? Economically speaking, 
the laws of supply and demand do realistically affect price. As was 
proved in 1929, a supply greater than an existing demand will depress 
the market. Can this principle of elementary economics be' applied to 
the valuation of securities under existing law? 
After having twice been declared invalid, 5 the 1934 Regulations 
expressly prohibiting a discount for blockage were revised, 6 and those 
a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or 
to sell. The fair market value of a particular kind of property includible in the 
gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price. Such value is to be 
determined by ascertaining as a basis the fair market value as of the applicable 
valuation date of each unit of the property. For example, in the case of shares 
of stock or bonds, such unit of property is a share or a bond. All relevant facts 
and elements of value as of the applicable valuation date should be considered in 
every case. 
(b) Real Estate. • • • 
(c) Stocks and Bonds.-The value of stocks and bonds, within the meaning 
of the Internal Revenue Code, is the fair market value per share or bond on the 
applicable valuation date. 
In the case of stocks and bonds listed on a stock exchange, the mean between 
the highest and lowest quoted selling prices on the valuation date shall be consid-
ered as the fair market value per share or bond. • • • 
If actual sales or bona fide bid and asked prices are not available, then • • • 
in the case of shares of stock, upon the basis of the company's net worth, earning 
power, dividend-paying capacity, and all other relevant Jactors having a bearing 
upon the value of the stock. Complete financial and other data upon which the 
valuation is based should be submitted with the return. 
In cases in which it is established that the value per bond or share of any secu-
rity determined on the basis of selling or bid and asked prices as herein provided 
does not reflect the fair market value thereof, then some reasonable modification 
of such basis or other relevant facts and elements of value shall be considered in 
determining fair market value. 
4· This is very nearly the definiti9n of "fair market value" found in Metropolitan 
Street Railway Co. v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 392, 398, 94 S. W. 86o, 861 (1906) : "the price 
which property will bring when it is offered for sale by one who is willing, but who is 
not obliged, to sell it, and is bought by one who is willing or desires to purchase, but 
is not compelled to do so." See also Helvering v. Wallbridge, 70 F. (2d) 683 (C. C. A. 
2d, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 594 (1934) ; Tracy v. Comm'r., 53 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. 
A. 6th, 1931); Doric Apartment Co. v. Comm'r., 94 F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 6th. 1938). 
5· Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F. (2d) 8o6 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), 
and Comm'r. v. Shattuck, 97 F. (2d) 790 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938). 
6. Regulations So (1934), Art. 13 (3), read in part: 
"In exceptional cases in which it is established by clear and convincing evi" 
dence that the value per bond or share of any security determined upon the basis 
of selling or bid and asked prices as herein provided does not reflect the fair mar-
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presently in force now directly permit some reasonable modification 
of the basis of "mean between bid and asked prices" where it can be 
shown that market quotations do not show actual fair market value. 
The rule that the value of a block of stock is conclusively estab-
lished merely by multiplying the value of one share at the market on 
the valuation date by the number of shares has been rejected by recent 
decisions.7 Further, the courts recognize that a market in which sales 
of small lots can be accomplished at a specified price may lack the 
body and breadth necessary to support sales of large blocks of securities 
at the same unit price. 8 Although no clear rule can be stated it is 
doubted whether the commissionjlas ever applied the blockage rule 
to a stockholding representing less than m% of the stock _outstanding. 
An interesting side-issue is whether several blocks transferred to several 
persons at substantially the same time can be considered as one block. 9 
In the recent case of Groff v. Munford/ 0 where a deduction for 
blockage was allowed, the Circuit Court said, "Estimates of value such 
as we have discussed are difficult to justify in detail for they involve 
factors the weight of which is uncertain, but they are more reliable 
than appraisals made in disregard of the amount of stock to be valued." 
As was said in Helvering v. Maytag,11 "As well as any contro-
verted question of administrative law may be settled without declara-
ket value thereof, other relevant facts and elements of value will be considered in 
determining the fair market value. The size of holdings of any security to be 
included in the gross estate is not a relevant factor, and will not be considered in 
such determination." 
The latest revision was by T. D. 5351, March 27, 1944· 
7· Havemeyer v. U. S., 59 F. Supp. 537 (Ct. of Cl., 1945), where petitioner valued 
16o,ooo shares at $25.00 against market of $28.125 and 20,000 other shares at $22.00 
against market o£ $24.50, and won on both valuations. At page 549, the Court ob-
served, "The Board was right in basing its conclusions upon the realities as it found 
them rather than upon considerations of abstract logic. It could not ignore the preg-
nant fact • • • that a large block of stock cannot be marketed and turned into money 
as readily as a few shares." Comm'r. v. Stewart's Estate, 153 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 
3rd, 1946) ; Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866 (D. C. Conn., 1945). 
Note: The Commissioner is quick to refuse to follow a :•market pri'ce" fixed by 
a few sales when he feels that "intrinsic value" is greater, Walter v. Duffy, 287 F. 41 
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1923) ; S. M. 2522, C. B. Dec. 1924. p. 23 ; Florence Guggenheim, 39 B. 
T. A. 251, II7 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Balti-
• more, 35 B. T. A. 259, 95 F. (2d) 8o6 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938). 
8. Richardson v. Comm'r., 151 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); Rice v. Eisner, 
16 F. (2d) 358, 361 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 764 (1927). "Any 
attempt to market so large a quantity would have probably sent down the value far 
below the prices which prevailed." Phipps v. Comm'r., 127 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. roth, 
1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 645 ( 1942) . Here the petitioner gave away ro,ooo 
shares to thirteen donees on the same day. The court treated this as thirteen separate 
blocks. Contra, Helvering v. Kimberley, 97 F. (2d) 433, 435 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), 
where the court said, "It is difficult to believe that the sale of three blocks of IO,ooo 
shares each would have had a different effect from a sale of one block of 30,000 
shares •.•• " But cf. Sewell L. Avery, 3 T. C. 963 (1944). 
9· See note 8 supra. 
10. ISO F. (2d) 825, 828 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). The Commissioner had valued 14,000 
shares of Electrolux stock at the Montreal exchange rate on the date of the gift, but 
the Tax Court reduced the valuation by $1.875 per share to $21.50. 
II. I25 F. (2d) 55, 63 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942), cerl. denied, 316 U. S. 689 (1942). 
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tion by the Supreme Court, it is established that the size of a blor;:k of 
listed stock may be a factor to be considered in its valuation for gift 
or estate tax purposes." 
Even in cases where no reduction in value for blockage is allowed, 
the courts generally pay dicta tribute to the ruleP Those cases that 
do not allow a reduction for blackage will be found to involve some 
special element such as rising markets, 13 closely-held stock that shows 
unusually high earnings, 14 actual trading of shares in quantities greater 
than the block, 15 or a block that carries with it control of a cor-
poration.16 
A very serious doubt can be raised as to the soundness of these 
four positions. They all proceed on the assumption that within a 
reasonable time after the critical date for valuation the owner is going 
to be able to receive an amount equal to or greater than the value 
fixed. But what kind of a valuation is this which uses totally unrelated 
hindsight to fix a valuation.17 Compare two owners ori January r, 
1946, both facing a rising market. Mr. A values his stock at the 
market $50 for he has only ro shares. The estate of Mr. B attempts 
to value its stock at $45 because it holds roo,ooo shares which the 
market will not absorb on the day of death at $so. In six months there 
has been a 20% increase. Mr. A received a profit of $ro per share. If 
Mr. B's estate is compelled to accept a valuation of $50 on January rst 
and yet cannot sell t~e stock within the six months for more than $55 
($5 off market) its profit will be limited to $5 rather than $ro. 
These exceptions and the blockage rule properly raise the question 
of the possible, and the most sound methods for valuing blocks of 
securities : 
12. Phipps v. Comm'r., 127 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942), cert. denied, 317 
U." S. 645 (1942); Robert L. Clause v. Comm'r., 5 T. C. 647 (1945), aff'd (C. C. A. 
4th, Apr. 18, 1946). · 
13. Gamble v. Comm'r., 101 F. (2d) s6s (C. c. A. 6th, 1939), cert. denied, 306 
U. S. 664 (1939). Within four months, the stock had advanced from market of $z8o. 
~~~ . . 
14. Allen, 3 T. C. 1224 (1944). The mean between high and low on the date of 
gift of Io,ooo shares was accepted as fair market value. 
15. Mott v. Comm'r., 139 F. (2d) 317 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943), involving Ioo,ooo 
shares of General Motors Corporation stock. In the two following months, 375,000 
shares were traded with no depreciation in the market. 
16. If the stock to be valued carries with it the control of the corporation, the 
value at market may ·be at a premi~m. Helvering v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 95 
F. (2d) 8o6, 812 (1938). A very similar situation arises in the valuation of undi-
vided interests in land, resulting in a depressed value for a minority interest, and an 
enhanced value for a controlling interest. Estate of Campanari, Tax Court Docket 
No. 4384, July 23, 1945; Estate of Henry, Tax Court Docket No. 109972, Dec. 7, I944· 
17. The correct use of hindsight is more properly reflected in the Portage Silica 
Co .• II B. T. A. 700 (1928), aff'd., 49 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931), cert. denied, 
284 U. S. 667 (1931), where it was used to demonstrate the unsoundness of theoretical 
computations of an antecedent date. See also Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petro-
leum Process Co., 289 U. S. 689, 6g8 (1933),, "But a different situation is presented 
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r. They might be valued at market without modification (if a 
market exists) .18 
2. At market modified by relevant considerations.19 
3· At the discount which a recognized brokerage firm would de-
mand to market the securities in view of the breadth and 
depth of the market. 
4· At the present value of the sums which could be realized by 
sale of the securities over the length of time required for sale 
in order not to depress the market.19a 
5· By dividing the assets by the number of shares outstanding 20 
(a) modified by the income or market record 
(b) unmodified. 
6. By capitalization of the earnings of the corporation as is done 
under A R M 34 to determine 1913 value or the value of 
good-will. 21 ' 
7· Through "expert" testimony.22 
8. By prorating the "profit" on a later sale over the period from 
date of purchase to date of sale, thus arriving at a "value" 
on the basic date. 23 
if years have gone by before the evidence is offered. Experience is thm available to 
correct uncertain Prophecy. Here is a book of wisdom that courts may not neglect. 
We find no rule of law that sets a clasp upon its pages, and forbids us to look within." 
IS. It must be recognized that a market "may e..'Cist independent of • • • sales," 
Crowell v. Comm'r., 62 F. (2d) 5I, 53 (C. C. A. 6th, I932). 
I9. It has been suggested that the use of the word "fair" in the statute bar$ "ex-
ceptional and e..'Ctraordinary conditions giving an abnormal value for the moment to 
stock." Strong v. Rogers, 72 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 3rd, I934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 
62I (I934). See also Regulations, supra note 3· 
I9a. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U. S. I35, 140 (I936); Safe Dep.osit 
& Trust Co. of Baltimore, 35 B. T. A. 259, 95 F. (2d) 8o6 (C. C. A. 4th, I938). 
20. Compare the Estate Tax Sections of the Int. Rev. Code and Regulation 105, 
sec. 8I.Io, cited supra note 3, with Int. Rev. Code § II3 (a) (I4) (1939), "In deter-
mining the fair market value of stock in a corporation as of March I, 19I3, due regard 
shall be given to the fair market value of the assets of the corporation as of that date." 
There is a general tendency to reject this as a controlling valuation method. Frank 
C. Rand, 40 B. T. A. 223 (I939), aff'd, II6 F. (2d) 7I8 (C. C. A. Ist, 1934). 
2I. See also A. R. R. 252, 3 CuM. BULL. 46 1920); Boyd v. Heiner, 5 A. F. T. R. 
6069 (W. D. Pa.) ; Rheinstrom v. Willcuts, 26 F. Supp. 306 (D. Minn. 1938) ; and the 
various Ford stock valuations-I2 B. T. A. 755, I2 B. T. A. 9I6, 12 B. T. A. 956, 12 
B. T. A. 935. I2 B. T. A. I085, 12 B. T. A. 1II1, I3 B. T. A. 20I, I3 B. T. A. 223 
(all decided in I928). 
22. The Commissioner is not bound to accept opinion evidence, Tracy v. Comm'r., 
53 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 6th, I93I), but it is admissible and often valuable, Heiner 
v. Crosby, 24 F. (2d) I9I (C. C. A. 3rd, I928), and may not be completely rejected, 
Dempsey Mill Mfg. Co. v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 604 (App. D. C. 193I). An exhaustive 
review of the issue of the weight to be given such opinion evidence will be in Gloyd 
v. Comm'r., 63 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 633 (1938). 
Note its extensive use in Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866 (D. C. Conn., 
I945). 
23. T. D. 2740, June 24. I9I8; T.B.M. 73, I C. B. 35 (I9I9); Hays v. Gauley 
Mountain Coal Co., 247 U. S. 189 (19I8). 
) 
? 
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CLOSED CORPORATION vALUATION 
One of the necessary elements in a fair market is the existence of 
a willing buyer. Where the stock of a corporation is closely held by, 
a few share-owners, the buyers are usually restricted in number to() 
those few. 24 Hence, the fair market value of a few shares will often 
bear little resemblance to its book or intrinsic value. It may well be 
that if the other stockowners are not particularly anxious to increase 
their holdings, that it will have to be offered at a substantial discount, 
or be held for sale for such a long period of time awaiting the appear-
ance of a willing buyer, that the owner can "no longer be regarded as 
a "willing" seller. Few people care to buy into a family affair.25 If 
"fair market value" is to be the criterion we shalf find a difference 
whether a minority interest or a majority interest 26 is being offered. 
In Richardson v. Commissioner, 21 thirty-three members of a 
family owned all roo,ooo shares of an investment company., The 
securities and other assets on the critical day had a fair market value 
of $9,809,000 but the shares of the family corporation were not listed 
on any exchange. In determining value, the Tax Court deducted ac-
crued taxes and other expenses, and divided by the number of shares 
to reach a value of $95.509 per share. Except for a study of corporate 
earnings and balance sheets, the Tax Court failed to specify which 
other factors had actually been applied as having h~d weight and 
relevance in its determination. 
Petitioner argued that no outsider could be found to buy a minor-
ity interest (5100 shares) in a family corporation except at a sub-
stantial discount from the price based upon the asset value. Other 
testimony sho.wed that in respect of a group of comparable corporations 
whose stocks were listed, there was a substantial differential between 
market value and asset value.28 , On appeal, Judge Hincks, who wrote 
24. Cartier v. Comm'r., 37 F. (2d) 894, 895 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930). "Stock in a 
dose corporation is notoriously hard to sell. There is no market except that afforded 
by the few other stockholders." 
25. A. B. C. Dohrmann, 19 B. T. A. 507, 515 (1930). 
26. See note 16 srtpra. 
27. 151 F. (2d) 102, 103 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). The second half of the decision 
involved the unlisted stock. The first half involved 12,487 shares of Vick Chemical 
Company stock. Sales averaged 4,000 per month, and under 400 per day in the gift 
year. For the six months preceding the critical date, the price trend was moderately 
upward. No blockage deduction was allowed, because "the tribunal charged with the 
task of valuation will not lightly deviate from evidence based on actual sales ; only 
when it is convinced by persuasive evidence that at the critical time the market was 
such that it could not absorb sales in the larger volume at· the price level obtaining for 
small lots will it conclude that such prices must be discounted in arriving at the fair 
market value pf large blocks." 
28. The 1944 amendment to section 81 .IO ( v) specifically authorizes consideration 
as a relevant factor the value of securities of corporations engaged in the same or a 
similar line of business whose securities are listed on an exchange. Cf. note 3 supra 
and Int. Rev. Code§ Sn (k) (1944 Amend.). 
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the opinion, expressed the belief that the Tax Judge had applied some 
personal notion of intrinsic value 29 instead of fair market value, as 
required by Treasury Department regulations. Feeling that there was 
substantial doubt as to the proper standards applied .in the Tax Court 
for this valuation, he favored a remand, but was overruled by his 
brethren on the court. 
In Blackard v. Commissioner,30 the same issue was decided, but 
with the opposite result. The District Court reversed the Tax Court 
and allowed a 25% deduction in valuing 4,584 shares in a family cor-
poration for estate taX purposes. The opinion rejected a determination 
of value arrived at by dividing the total value of the gros.s assets by 
the number of outstanding shares as being arbitrary, and fixing an 
excessive value upon the shares. "The method followed was in con-
flict with the then prevailing regulations of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue as promulgated by the Secretary of Treasure." 31 
The use of the words "fair market value" when applied to closely 
held stock is meaningless. Because there is no market to guide, such 
stock must be appraised in some other way. Other factors such as 
trend of business,_ earnings, book value, blockage, minority or con-
trolling interest, and intrinsic worth are material. However, care must 
be exercised in closely held stock to distinguish intrinsic value from 
clear market value, as the two are easily confused. 32 Interfamily 
transactions merit little if any weight in determining fair value. 33 
Value determined by capitalizing the average earnings over a five year 
period has been considered merely evidentiary, and if this formula is 
used to the exclusion of any other evidence, the valuation may be held 
erroneous as a matter of law.84 
REsTRICTIVE CoVENANTS 
Restrictive covenants are of many varieties and have widely vary-
ing effects on stock valuation. They may make a sale impossible 85 
and render the value practically nil or show that the stoc~ has no "fair 
29. The Ta.'( Court judge deplored the use of family holding companies to deal in 
securities for the owners as a device to avoid taxes. He felt that the only real or 
practical way to value such an investment company was "by primarily considering 
the value of the securities owned by the corporation. Any other approach would • • . 
be futile." 151 F. (2d) 102, 105. 
30. 62 F. Supp. 234 (W. D. Okla., 1944). 
31. Ibid. at page 237. See also Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866 
(D. C. Conn., 1945). 
32. A. B. C. Dohrmann, 19 B. T. A. 507 (1930). 
33· True v. U.S., 5I F. Supp. 720, 726 (1943). 
34· A. R. M. 34 was the formula used to determine the value of a business on March 
I, 1913, and it is still used to determine the value of intangibles such as good will, 
special skill, or business "know how." Worcester' County Trust Co. v. Comm'r., R., 
134 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 1st, 1943). 
35. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U. S. 481 (1937). 
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market value." 36 Few covenants will affect value in the same way. 
One may operate to the advantage of both the seller and purchaser, to 
maintain the market or enhance the market value. 37 Another may 
merely give a certain person a first opportunity to purchase without 
any substantial effect on value, 38 or the restriction may be as to the 
length of time within which no sale may be made, where the courts 
have attempted a rather arbitrary distinction between limitations of 
more or less than a year.39 But it is not with this type of restrictive 
covena~t that we are concerned-we shall instead examine the cove-
nants which mention or attempt to set a price. What affect on valua-
tion do these have? 
- These ~ovenants may be either ineffective, partially effective, or 
fully effective to establish a value for the stock. In determining into 
which of the three above categories a covenant falls, the courts attempt 
to discover the actual interest that is being transferred. The test does 
-not appear to be ''specific enforceability of the restriction," as some 
courts have decided.40 
The test seems to be the converse of the rule which tests the tax-
ability of a pre-death trust in the decedent's estate. Thereunder there 
is included in the gross estate of a decedent the value of any trust 
which he established during life over which at the date of death he 
possessed a power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate. If the decedent 
had some beneficial interest, his estate paid a tax. The test for the . 
restrictive covenant which is fully effective in establishing its stipulated 
value as the value of the stock is : Does someone have a vested adverse 
interest in the stock, effective during decedent's lifetime, so that the 
value of the property is not affected by death? Did the owner sur-
36. Propper v. Comm'r., 89 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; U. S. v. State Street 
Trust Co., 124 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942). 
37· G. & K. Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r., 76 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). If a cov-
enant provides that the stock can only be paid for out of dividends, its value is actually 
far greater than that stated on its face, or that listed as book value, even though a sec-
ond covenant requires that the stock be resold to the corporation at book value if·em-
ployment in the concern ceases. Behles v. Comm'r., 87 F. (2d) 228 (C. C. A. 7th, 
. 1937). 
38. Jay v. Darling, 4 B. T. A. 499 (1926). 
39· T. W. Henritze, 28 B. T. A. II73 (1933) ; Heiner v. Gwinner, II4 'F. (2d) 
723 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). See Goldwasser v. Comm'r., 47 B. T. A. 445 (1942), af/'d., 
142 F. (2d) 556 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), where taxpayer could make no offering but must 
hold it as investment. 
40. Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F. (2d) 682 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), and Lomb v. Sugden, 
82 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). Stockholders agreed that transfer of shares was 
forbidden without first offering it to other stockholders at a price about 30% less than 
market at the date of decedent's death. It was held that the taxable value of the stock 
was limited by this contract since it was specifically enforceable. The value of the 
stock to the estate could be no greater than that with which the deceased parted. 
But the courts have been extremely reluctant of late to follow these two cases, and 
generally find some ground for distinguishing. See Krauss v. U. S., 140 F. (2d) 510 
cc. c. A. 5th, 1944). 
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render a part of his legal rights or present interest in the stock? 41 If 
he did, the restrictive covenant will be fully effective in establishing 
a value for the stock. 42 Because few owners care to restrict their 
ownership to this extent, such covenants appear quite rarely. 
The mass of litigation concerns the other two types-the partially 
effective, and the ineffective covenants. These two types are worded 
quite similarly, but whether or not the covenant determines value seems 
to depend upon whether the transferor is a donor or a testator. If he 
is a donor, and his stock is subject to an option at a fixed or deter-
minable price, the Commissioner generally allows a reasonable dis-
count in value for the effect of the restriction, 43 but he is not bound by 
it.44 It the estate tax is involved, however, the general rule is that 
the stock must be included at its full value in the tax return; the differ-
ence in price between the option and market is a legacy to the optionee. 45 
Although covenants do not. often establish a value so far as the 
estate is concerned, they do fix a value upon the stock for the optionee. 
In Mack v. Commissioner 46 the taxpayer acquired stock under an 
option in the will of his father at a price equal to one-half of its actual 
41. Estate of Matthews, 3 T. C. 525, 528 (1944). 
42· Comm'r. v. Bensel, 100 F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), where decedent 
agreed with his son that his estate would sell stock at son's option if the son would 
continue in his e.-.::ecutive position in the father's corporation during the latter's life-
time. 
See also: Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U. S. 481 (1937), where the cov-
enant operated to prevent a sale: Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 1o6 (1936), holding 
that the value to the optionee at the time of acquisition is the option price, not the 
fair market value. 
43· James v. Comm'r., 148 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). Petitioner gave his 
son 100 shares in a closely held corporation which were subject to the stockholder's 
agreement that they could not be transferred unless they were first offered to the 
stockholders at $200 per share. The book value at the time of the gift was $385.05 
per share. The Commissioner made an allowance for the covenant by valuing it at 
$310.00. 
Raymond J. Moore, 3 ~ C. 1205 (1944). Donee could not dispose of stock with-
out first offering it to the directors of the corporation in their individual capacity, then 
to the stockholders at the adjusted book value. All gave consent to the trust. In view 
of the high earnings of the corporation, the court felt that the Commissioner had 
allowed a sufficient deduction for the restrictive effect of the agreement. 
Estate of James Smith, 46 B. T. A. 337 (1942). 
44· Kline v. Comm'r., 130 F. (2d) 742 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942). Two covenants were 
involved. The first prevented sale without the consent of the company. The second 
subjected the stock to a one year option to purchase at 3373% to 75% of book value 
if the owner left the employ of the company. The gift was approved, and petitioner 
valued at 3373%. The Commissioner chose 75% of book plus surplus earnings avail-
able on the stock. The Commissioner's determination was upheld. 
45· The Cern Securities Corp. v. U. S., 102 Ct Cl. 86 (1944). An option to pur-
chase 1000 shares at $10 when market was $22.75 per share amounts to a combination 
promise to sell and a promise to make a gift of $12,750. 
Estate of Matthews, 3 T. C. 525 (1944). Decedent and a business associate agreed 
that the survivor should have an option to purchase all the stock of the deceased at 
$90.00 per share if purchased within three months of death. Both parties were free 
to dispose of stock 'during life. Fair market value for estate tax purposes was held 
to be $120.00 and not the option price. 
Claire G. Hoffman, 2 T. C. n6o (1943). The difference between the option price 
and market is a legacy. 
46. 148 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945). 
374 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 
market value. When the optionee decided to sell the stock, he could 
, not include the value of his option in his base to determine his capital 
gain, although the estate may have paid a tax upon its value as a 
legacy. The basis of the stock was held to be the amount which he 
actually paid. Hence, as the law now stands, such an option is subject 
to double taxation, once under the estate tax as a legacy, and a second 
time under the income tax as a capital gain.47 
TAX PRACTICE 
When an appeal is made from the valuation set by the Commis-
sioner, the courts are wont to notice the subsequent history of the 
stock. The Electrolux shares in the Groff v. Munford 48 case had 
· dropped to $22.00 per share at the end of the third month following 
the gift. The Tax Court is not obliged to close its mind to subsequent 
facts which demonstrate the correCtness of the Commissioner's deter-
mination.49 It can be argued, of course, that events subsequent to 
the critical date should have no effect upon taxable value. Actually, 
this "hindsight" is not used to establish a value, but is used merely as 
evidence to prove that a valuation chosen on a certain date was correct. 
To this practice there can be no real objection, not only because it 
proves that no real mistake was made, but also because it may often 
inure to the taxpayer's benefit. If the stock drops in price, he can 
introduce into evidence the lower rates of subsequent months to prove 
that th~ Commissioner valued too high. 
This was done in the Avery case 50 to obtain a lower valuation 
than the market on the day of a gift of Montgomery Ward Company 
stock. The Tax Court studied the quotations on this stock not only 
for the entire month of the gift, but for the two succeeding months as 
well, to conclude that a fair valuation was $36.50 per share instead of 
$37.50 as claimed by the Commissioner. 
The tax lawyer should marshal his strongest case for the Tax 
Court, for here is his best chance to overrule the Commissioner. Gen-
erally speaking, the Government is no more anxious to litigate than 
is the taxpayer. But if the case does go to the Tax Court, the likeli-
47· Despite § II3 (a) (5) of 26 U. S. C. A. 
48. 150 F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), cited sttpra note 10. 
49· Mott v. Comm'r., 139 F. (2d) ·317 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943). 
50. Sewell L. Avery, 3 T. C. 963 (1944). Four gifts of 6,500 shares of M. W. 
and 4,000 shares of U. S. Gypsum were made on Dec. 31. For January and February 
following, the M. W. Co. stock varied between 35~ and 39~, while the U. S. Gypsum 
varied between 6o and 69~. The Tax Court determined that 36~ and 64~ were 
respectively the fair market values. The court took note of a disposal of 4,700 shares 
of U. S. Gypsum two years later, which was effected witli.out depressing the market. 
Similarly, a secondary distribution of Ward stock a year after the gift brought $37.50 
per share to the vendors, when market was $39.00. · 
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hood that its decision will be accepted is great. Unless the Commis-
sioner feels that the Tax Court is clearly in error, he will not appeal 
further, for appeals from the Tax Court have not been fruitful. The 
Circuit Courts constantly emphasize that the determination of the Tax 
Court is not subject to review if supported by some substantial evi-
dence. 51 In fact, the statute provides that the Tax Court may be 
reversed only on the law. 52 
The question of value is a question of fact. But the decision may 
involve one of law. 53 While the Circuit Court may not challenge facts 
found by the Tax Court if supported by some substantial evidence, the 
determination of the rule or standard of valuation to be applied, raises a 
question of law which is reviewable by the higher court. 54 But ordi-
narily, weighing the evidence, determining its probative value, and 
drawing inferences therefrom is peculiarly and exclusively the func-
tion of the Tax Court. 55 
The general rule is that the burden of showing that there is an 
overassessment is on the taxpayer.56 Hence he must make out a case 
to show that the Commissioner's determination is invalid, but he is 
not required to establish by evidence the correct amount.57 However, 
the same evidence that indicates that the Commissioner had overvalued 
will generally affirmatively show the correct value. 
In the rare case where the Commissioner values stock above 
market rate, is this rule as to burden of proof changed? It can be 
argued that since the regulations require market rate where available, 
the burden of proof should fall upon the party who wishes to modify 
51. Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F. (zd) 55 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942). Here trading was 
"continuous" and the amounts of stock changing hands "substantial," but there were 
no trades involving 133,000 or 400,000 shares. The Court affirmed the determinations 
of the Board of Tax Appeals at $3.10 and $3.80 per share against the Commissioner 
and market of $4-75 and $4.56 per share. The Circuit Court made no attempt to an-
swer the skilled arguments on behalf of the government, contenting itself to cite sL~­
teen cases in the various circuits in support of its decision. 
52. Int. Rev. Code § II4I (c) (1) (1939); John Kelly v. Comm'r., 66 S. Ct. 299 
(1946); Dobson v. Comm'r., 320 U.S. 489 (1943). 
53. Powers v. Comm'r., 312 U. S. 259 (1941). 
54· Comm'r. v. McCann, 146 F. (zd) 385, 386 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). "We say 
nothing as to how the shares shall be appraised; that is, the Tax Court's duty, from 
any interference in which we must rigidly abstain. It may come to the same conclu-
sions after weighing all the relevant factors." As a matter of law here, the evidence 
did not support the findings, because the lower court failed to weigh these relevant 
factors: (a) The average dividend of 12% for the nine preceding years; (b) The tax-
payer owned two-thirds of the stock, and could therefore change the by-laws con-
taining the restrictive covenant at will; (c) The prospective earnings of the corpora-
tion; (d) The life expectancy of the donor, since the gift was to his wife. 
55. Zanuck v. Comm'r., 149 F. (zd) 714 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945). "Petitioner urged 
that the Tax Court had failed to give sufficient weight to the evidence showing the 
war's effect upon the corporation's extensive foreign holdings, or to the effect of its 
current labor troubles. Here there was a gift of 30,000 shares of Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp. stock in trust to three children. No argument was made for applying 
the blockage rule. Market rate prevailed .. 
56. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507, 514 (1935). 
57· Worcester County Trust Co. v. Comm'r., 134 F. (zd) 578 (C. C. A. 1st, 1943). 
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the market rate. In Estate of Spencer v. Commissioner, 58 the court 
refused to expressly deny the presumption of correctness of the Com-
missioner's valuation, but it did say that if the Commissioner was to 
choose any value other than market rate, that he should show the 
other relevant facts and elements that affected value. This he had not 
done, so the Tax Court in effect sustained petitioner's contention by 
valuing at market. 
CoNCLUSION 
The Internal Revenue Code, the Regulations and the Courts seek 
to apply a primarily objective test of value. They seek facts, but 
facts can never be completely divorced from opinion. Obviously, no 
test can be completely objective, because buyers and sellers in any 
market make subjective tests of value before trading. The most ob-
jective test of all, namely, actual market rate, is nothing less than a 
series of individual subjective estimates by those who do trade. 
The normal way of showing value is by evidence of actual sales 
upon a free and open market. It is also well settled that value may be 
shown by the opinion of any competent person having knowledge of 
the facts, whether an expert or an ordinary witness,59 though the 
tendency is to treat this as secondary evidence because subjective. If 
expert, they should testify in blockage cases to the result of a skillful 
liquidation of the block over a reasonable time, and not to the result 
to be expected from a liquidation to be accomplished in ten days. 60 
Too, the courts seem to prefer opinion evidence based upon good busi-
ness sense to the use of formulas, although the use of a formula cap-
italizing earnings is permissible as a factor to be considered along with 
other evid~nce in arriving at a value. 61 
In the blockage field, the rationale of economics is permitted to 
temper a determination of value, because otherwise, the application 
of a purely objective test becomes arbitrary, and, for closely held stock, 
objective evidence is difficult to obtain. Tax Commissioners are un-
willing to accept par or book value, especially where the corporate 
earnings record belies such figures. They then attempt to capitalize 
earnings and to apply some test such as A. R. M. 34· Finally, in the 
field of restrictive covenants, although the stock itself may be valued 
objectively by market in some instances, the restriction must be 
analyzed, and a subjective estimate of its effect upon the value of the 
stock must be made. 
58. Tax Court Docket No. 2254, Oct. I2, 1945. 
59· Montana Railway Company v. Warren, 137 U. S. 348, 353 (r8go). 
6o. Richardson v. Comm'r., 151 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). 
61. White & Wells Co. v. Comm'r., 50 F. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); Robert-
son v. Routzahn, 75 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935); Estate of James Smith, 46 B. 
T. A. 337 (1942). Average return for five years is capitalized usually at ro%, but 
often at IS%, and sometimes at 20%, if the business is speculative. 
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Although there may be some logic in such positions as that 
valuing large blocks at a lesser price per unit than small holdings will 
benefit the rich 62 and that if the market rises no reduction for blockage 
should be allowed, these would seem to have no justification under our 
tax plan. The statute already taxes large estates at higher rates than 
lesser estates. Any further adjustment necessary should be made 
through these rates-not by torturing concepts of valuation. It must 
be remembered that valuation comes into the picture solely to determine 
how large the estate is on the date of death or the gift at the date of gift. 
Ultimately, the best criterion for measuring value probably lies 
in an analysis such as a prudent investor would require of an ex-
perienced broker. This might call for a revision of existing regulations 
to permit a freer exercise of discretion by the tax assessor. Evi-
dentially this should require consideration of all the factors already 
outlined, with emphasis on the methods by which the stock could in 
fact be disposed of. 
62. Bingham's Adm. v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 318, 244 S. W. 781 (1922), aff'd., 
199 Ky. 402, 251 S. W. g86 (1923); Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 
8th, 1942). 
